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AN ATTORNEY'S PRIMER ON FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11
"Although the pleading and amendment of pleadings rules in federal
court are to be liberally construed, the administration of justice is not
well served by the filing of premature, hastily drawn complaints."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers have long been subject to sanctions for filing pleadings they
know are groundless. Until 1983, under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, an attorney who signed a pleading certified that he had
read the pleading, and that "to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief there [was] good ground to support it ....". I However, sanc-
tions under the Rule were rarely imposed upon attorneys.3 Courts were
reluctant to apply the Rule because its language was vague and the re-
quired standard of conduct was merely subjective.4 As a result, lawyers
perhaps were lulled into carelessly verifying the facts and the law upon
which pleadings were based.
In 1983, Rule 11 was amended to impose upon lawyers an affirma-
tive duty to make a reasonable inquiry to determine if the pleading filed
"is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law."5 The
1. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 n.13 (1984) (referring to FED. R. Civ. P. I1 (effective
Aug. 1, 1983)).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1982).
3. In his study of FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Risinger reported that from 1938 to 1976 only 23 cases
were reported in which Rule 11 was invoked by one party to strike another's pleadings, and in only
nine cases were violations found. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Strik-
ing" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 34-36 (1977).
4. Id. at 14. Prior to amendment, Rule 11 required a willful violation before a court could
impose sanctions.
5. Rule 11 in its entirety states:
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions and Other Papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be
stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or
other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that
the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two wit-
nesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signa-
ture of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading,
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it
is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
1
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amendment imposes new duties on attorneys who sign pleadings. Attor-
neys must become familiar with the stricter standards to which they will
be held under the amended Rule. Since the amendment, sanctions have
been imposed in a great number of cases,6 confirming that the members
of the legal profession must become aware of their obligations.
Rule 11 now requires attorneys to satisfy three obligations to avoid
sanctions. First, the attorney must certify that each of his pleadings, mo-
tions, or other papers is both well grounded in fact and warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for a change in existing law.7 Sec-
ond, the attorney must make a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law
upon which the pleading is based.' Finally, the attorney must further
certify that the document is not being filed for an improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation.9 Violation of these standards will result in the imposition of
sanctions upon the attorney and perhaps even the client. 10
Attorneys have an inherent interest in the application of Rule 11
because of the increased frequency of sanctions since the amendment of
the rule. Of special interest to attorneys and their clients are the stan-
dards to which an attorney is held under Rule 11, circumstances that
might trigger the invocation of the Rule, possible sanctions that might be
imposed, and the identification of persons who may be sanctioned.
or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
The 1983 amendment met with some opposition by attorneys who feared "satellite litigation"
and the damaging effects of a Rule 11 sanction upon a firm's reputation. See Batista, Amended Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: How Go the Best Laid Plans?, Introductory Remarks, 54
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1985); Weiss, Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
How Go the Best Laid Plans?, A Practitioner's Commentary on the Actual Use of Amended Rule 11,
54 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 26 (1985).
6. Rule I1 has been discussed in over 300 federal cases since its modification. See, e.g., Maier
v. Orr, 758 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (sanctions imposed for frivolousness); Harris v. WGN Conti-
nental Broadcasting Co., 650 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (attorney admonished for his frivolous
claim); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (sanctions im-
posed where claim was unconscionable).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
[Vol. 23:149
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II. HISTORY OF RULE 11
Before amendment, Rule 11 was rarely used.11 The Rule's infre-
quent use was the result of its unenforceable standards. Attorneys were
disciplined only for a willful violation of the Rule, and although plead-
ings could be stricken as "sham and false," they must have been signed
with an intent to defeat the purpose of the Rule before they would be
stricken.12 Furthermore, the Rule did not specify what disciplinary ac-
tions could be taken for a violation of the Rule.13 Thus, the Rule re-
quired an inquiry into intent and failed to provide an explicit list of
possible sanctions.
Courts were also reluctant to apply Rule 11 because they found its
language vague and difficult to interpret. 4 The phrase "good ground"
was especially troublesome. 5 Courts rarely hesitated to find that the at-
torney had good ground to support his pleading and that he had acted in
good faith.1 6 Rule 11 was so loosely interpreted that courts saw little
reason to use it to impose sanctions on attorneys.
11. Wright and Miller state that "there is little evidence of frequent use of sanctions for viola-
tion of Rule I 1." 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1334, at 503
(1969) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]. The Rule was also criticized "as having little effect on
actual conduct." Id. at § 1333.
12. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1982). In pertinent part, the rule stated:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to
defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may
proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken
if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
Id.
Oklahoma only recently adopted the amended federal Rule 11. 1987 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 302
(West). The effective date of the Oklahoma amendment is November 1, 1987. Prior to this amend-
ment, Oklahoma's version of Rule 11, codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2011 (Supp. 1986), was in
large part identical to the old Rule 11. Both the Oklahoma and federal Rules required a willful
violation as a prerequisite for sanctions. No cases are reported in Oklahoma since the Rule was
adopted in November, 1985. Apparently, if the Oklahoma Rule was ever imposed, the parties did
not feel that the sanctions were great enough to justify an appeal. As the Oklahoma courts begin to
implement the new Rule, it is likely they will follow the federal lead and impose sanctions more
frequently.
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1982).
14. Risinger, supra note 3, at 5. Wright and Miller also criticized the Rule for this reason. They
speculated that courts could impose any extra costs resulting from a violation of the Rule and cite
the attorney for contempt, or institute disbarment proceedings. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1334, at
503.
15. Risinger, supra note 3, at 9. Risinger considered the standard to be nebulous. Id. at 15.
16. In one case, the court held that attorneys had satisfied their Rule 11 obligation even though
they had based their pleading entirely on a Wall Street Journal article without further investigation.
Dresnin v. Ramada Inns, Inc. (In re Ramada Inns Sec. Litig.), 550 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (D. Del.
1982).
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Because Rule 11 was rarely used, it was very ineffective. The deci-
sion in Di Silvestro v. United States 17 illustrates the old Rule's ineffective-
ness. Di Silvestro, a pro se litigant, had been filing lawsuits for thirty
years, claiming that he had been wrongfully denied veteran's benefits af-
ter serving in World War II."s In 1983, Di Silvestro's complaint was
dismissed on grounds of res judicata and he was permanently enjoined
from filing any future lawsuits to recover veteran's benefits. 19 Di Silves-
tro was finally sanctioned in 1985 when he instituted another suit subse-
quent to the Rule's amendment. Attorney's fees were assessed against
him for filing a vexatious and bad faith suit.2" Cases such as Di Silvestro
suggest that the amendment of Rule 11 was needed to halt frivolous
suits.
To curb the abuses of the judicial system and in light of the "litiga-
tion explosion,"21 the Advisory Committee resolved to put "teeth" into
the "bite" of Rule 11.22 The resulting amendment made several signifi-
cant changes to the Rule. The new Rule emerged with greater clarity,
specificity, stringency, and enforceability.23 Sanctions may now be im-
17. 767 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 862 (1985).
18. A look at the litigious history of Di Silvestro's claims will show how he abused the legal
system: Di Silvestro v. United States, No. CV 83-0895 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1983) (Mishler, J.), aff'd
mem., 742 F.2d 1436 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984); Di Silvestro v. United States,
No. 79 C 1931 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1980) (Mishler, C.J.), aff'd mem., 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980), motion to extend time for appeal denied, No. 79 C 1931
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1981) (Mishler, C.L), motion to proceed informa pauperis, No. 81-6247 (2d Cir.
Jan. 6, 1982), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982), motion to reopen denied (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1982)
(Mishler, J.), aff'd mem., 697 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1177 (1983); Di Silves-
tro v. United States, No. 78 C 1525 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Mishler, C.J.), aff'd mem., (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1976); Di Silvestro v. Veterans Admin., No. 76 C 1167 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(Mishler, C.J.), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840 (1977); Di Silvestro v.
United States, 268 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (Mishler, J.), rev'd, 405 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 964 (1969); Di Silvestro v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 825 (1960); Di Silvestro v. United States Veterans Admin., 151 F. Supp. 337
(E.D.N.Y. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 935 (1958); Di Silvestro v. United States Veterans Admin.,
132 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 228 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1009 (1956).
For related claims, see Di Silvestro v. Gray, 194 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 930 (1952); Di Silvestro v. United States Veterans Admin., 81 F. Supp. 844
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 173 F.2d 933 (2d Cir.), motion to vacate order dismissing complaint denied, 9
F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1949), amended complaint dismissed, 10 F.R.D. 20 (E.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd,
181 F.2d 502 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 989 (1950).
19. Di Silvestro v. United States, 767 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 862 (1985).
20. Id. at 33.
21. Partridge, Wikinson & Krouse, A Complaint Based on Rumors: Countering Frivolous Liti-
gation, 31 Loy. L. REV. 221, 227-35 (1985). This article examines the surge of "overcrowded court
dockets and increasing costs to the judicial system" which has been noted by former Chief Justice
Burger and others. Id. at 227.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes. These goals are stated in the committee
notes which clearly express the legislative intent.
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posed based on an objective, rather than a subjective standard. The re-
quired standard of conduct focuses on individual facts and law rather
than on a general requirement of good grounds to support the pleading. 4
Punishment may be imposed on either the attorney, the client, or both.
In addition, the power to invoke the Rule was made explicit.2" Finally,
the new Rule deletes the confusing provision regarding the striking of a
pleading because it was rarely utilized. 6 The new provisions eliminated
the infirmities of the old Rule by making the Rule clear and simple to
apply.
The amendment was welcomed by most, but not all attorneys.
Some feared satellite litigation in which attorneys neglect the merits of a
case while pursuing Rule 11 evidence.27 However, the Advisory Com-
mittee anticipated this concern and limited evidence in a Rule 11 motion
to that in the record.28 Other attorneys opposed the amendment because
it eliminated the motion to strike. They argued that the motion to strike
was the most effective sanction provided in the old rule.29 Still others
opposed the new Rule because they feared that the imposition of sanc-
tions on an attorney would greatly damage a law firm's reputation.30
However, Rule 11 was amended in spite of these concerns.
III. USE OF THE AMENDED RULE
A. Circumstances Triggering Rule 11
Rule 11 explicitly describes at least five circumstances which consti-
tute a violation of the Rule.31 These circumstances include (1) the
pleading is not well grounded in fact; (2) the pleading is not warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for a change in law; (3) the plead-
ing is interposed merely to increase the costs of litigation ; (4) the plead-
ing is interposed merely to harass the other party; and (5) the pleading is
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Discovery may be conducted in extraordinary circumstances by leave of the court. Id.
29. Lerner & Schwartz, Why Rule 11 Shouldn't be Changed The Proposed Cure Might Exac-
erbate the Disease, Nat. L.J., May 9, 1983, at 13, col. 2. The significance of Rule 11 was attached to
the fact that "only Rule I 1 permits a court to strike pleadings which are drafted to withstand Rule 8
and 12 motions to dismiss, but which are completely devoid of any factual basis." Id. at col. 3.
30. Weiss, supra note 5, at 26. Mr. Weiss complained that a Rule 11 motion had damaged the
reputation of his law firm and that his firm was subjected to having that decision cited against it in
forums all over the country. Id.
31. "Pleading" shall refer collectively to pleadings, motions, and other papers.
19871
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interposed to unnecessarily delay the litigation. 32 A lawsuit which is not
well grounded in law or fact will be deemed "frivolous" and other viola-
tions will be deemed to have an improper purpose. An explicit descrip-
tion of these circumstances clarified the Rule to help ensure that the
courts would utilize it to impose sanctions.33
B. Filing a Frivolous Pleading
One of the aims of Rule 11 is to prevent attorneys from filing plead-
ings for which they have not made a reasonable inquiry into the law and
facts. The standard to which attorneys are held is reasonable under the
circumstances at the time that the pleading was submitted. 34 Because the
standard is one of objective reasonableness, courts may act without re-
gard to the attorney's state of mind.35 A willful or negligent failure to
correctly state facts or law is irrelevant in determining reasonableness.36
However, the rule is not one of strict liability.37 The standard is "reason-
ableness measured objectively. ' 38  Rule 11 now imposes a stricter duty
than the old Rule 11 by requiring an objectively reasonable prefiling in-
vestigation, rather than a subjective test of good faith.
Courts take several factors into account when determining reasona-
bleness. The amount of time available for inquiry is a consideration.39
Presumably, courts will be more lenient if the attorney had only a day or
two to prepare the pleading. Another factor courts will consider is
whether the signer of the pleading had to rely on another person, such as
a client or the client's previous attorney, for the facts.4 0 Clients do not
always tell their attorneys the truth, but an attorney should not expect to
be exempt from liability on that basis.4" The attorney must not rely
solely on a client for the facts. Instead, he or she must independently
inquire into the facts to satisfy Rule 11 obligations.42 Whether the attor-
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
34. Id.
35. Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 13, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 771
F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
36. Coburn Optical Indus. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D.C.N.C. 1985). However, the
advisory committee stated that willfulness is a factor to be taken into account when a court is deter-
mining the severity of sanctions. See infra notes 96-117 and accompanying text.
37. Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. McMullan, 801 F.2d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 1986).
38. Id. See also In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 499 (N.D. Ill. 1985), appeal dismissed, 793
F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
40. Id.
41. See Coburn Optical Indus. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D.C.N.C. 1985).
42. Id.
[Vol. 23:149
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss1/6
FRCP 11
ney conducted a reasonable inquiry will also vary according to the type
of the litigation, and the extent of the investigation.43 Finally, another
important consideration is the degree of hardship caused to the opposing
side by the insufficient inquiry.4
An attorney's duty is not complete even though he has filed a plead-
ing and has determined after reasonable inquiry that it is well grounded
in law and fact. As new facts are revealed, an attorney is obligated to
continually review and reevaluate what he has previously stated in his
pleading.45 An attorney is obliged under Rule 11 to reevaluate an earlier
certification if later investigation reveals evidence which indicates that
his position has no factual or legal basis.46
A pleading which is not based on existing law may sometimes be the
basis for sanctions. Unless the attorney is urging a good faith change in
existing law, a pleading must reflect a plausible view of the law.47 The
reasonableness of a pleading depends on several factors. If the pleading
was based on an incorrect legal theory, courts will consider the complex-
ity of the area of jurisprudence upon which the pleading was based.48
For example, if the law is difficult, complex, and evolving,49 courts may
be lenient. One court has even ruled that sanctions should be imposed
only "where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of
success." 5 Finally, doubts regarding the possible success of the pleading
might be resolved in favor of the signer.5" Such liberal applications of
Rule 11 are rare and may be contrary to the intent of the Rule,52 which
seeks to punish litigants who pursue baseless vindication of claims.5 3
Nevertheless, they may provide relief to attorneys who have been ac-
cused of Rule 11 violations.
43. Id. (citing Wold v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166, 167 (D. Colo. 1983)).
44. Id.
45. Woodfork ex rel Houston v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100, 104 (N.D. Miss. 1985).
46. Id.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
48. Rice v. Heckler, 640 F. Supp. 1051, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
49. Id.
50. Monument Builders, Inc. v. American Cemetary Assoc., 629 F. Supp. 1002, 1012 (D.
Kan.), modified, 647 F. Supp. 972 (1986). In one case, a complaint alleging antitrust violations
formed the basis for Rule 11 sanctions because the complaint was filed against non-competitors and
did not allege any antitrust injury. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d
Cir. 1985), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (1987).
51. Monument Builders, 629 F. Supp. at 1011.
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes state that one aim of Rule 11 is to streamline
litigation. Although a frivolous lawsuit has a chance of success, it certainly does not further the goal
of streamlining litigation.
53. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. No. 8, 802 F.2d 247,
255 (7th Cir. 1986).
1987]
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The reasonableness of a pleading is not always destroyed by a dis-
missal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 4
Where nothing shows that the claims are meritless or filed for an im-
proper purpose, Rule 11 sanctions will be denied even though the claim
is dismissed. 5  However, in some situations a motion for dismissal and a
motion for sanctions go hand-in-hand. In those cases, a reasonable
prefiling inquiry might have revealed that the complaint was not war-
ranted by existing law.56 A dismissal will be the basis for sanctions if the
pleading is frivolous or filed for an improper purpose.
Frivolous pleadings are often found when the issue upon which they
are based is res judicata.5" A claim which is res judicata in state court
should not be refied in a federal court. Often a reasonable prefiling in-
vestigation will convince an able attorney that such claims are merit-
less. 8 Thus a dismissal for res judicata will justify sanctions if it is
unreasonable to pursue the claim.
Although a pleading which asserts a new cause of action or legal
theory may not necessarily be supported by existing law, it does not auto-
matically warrant sanctions. As the Advisory Committee noted, Rule 11
was "not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pur-
suing factual or legal theories."59 Thus Rule 11 sanctions are not auto-
matically imposed after an unsuccessful attempt to assert a novel cause of
action.60 Instead, an attempt to assert an unsuccessful novel cause will
escape sanctions if it is an objectively reasonable effort to challenge the
existing law.61
However, an attorney who realizes his case requires a change in ex-
isting law may instead decide to try to "fit" the case into existing law. If
an attorney, rather than attempting to change the existing law, attempts
to "squeeze" his client's case into the form of existing law by irresponsi-
bly and artlessly presenting the case, it is proper to impose sanctions
54. Ring v. R.J. Reynold Indus., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (N.D. Il. 1984), aff'd, 804 F.2d
143 (7th Cir. 1986).
55. Bower v. Weisman, 639 F. Supp. 532, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
56. See, e.g., Ring, 597 F. Supp. at 1281.
57. See, eg., Di Silvestro v. United States, 767 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 862
(1985) (after filing lawsuits for 30 years, the plaintiff was finally sanctioned for filing a claim which
had been ruled res judicata in an earlier case and which he had been enjoined from refiling); Colum-
bus v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 641 F. Supp. 707, 711-12 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (res judicata barred the suit
and sanctions were imposed on both the plaintiff and the attorney).
58. Johnson v. New York Transit Auth., 639 F. Supp. 887, 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) modified, 823
F.2d 31 (2nd Cir. 1987).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
60. Skepton v. County of Bucks, 613 F. Supp. 1013, 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
61. Id.
[Vol. 23:149
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upon the attorney.62 Therefore, pleadings which are not an objectively
reasonable attempt to change law or present a client's case can be the
basis for sanctions.
How unreasonable must an attorney's pleading be before Rule 11
sanctions are warranted? One court has stated that sanctions are war-
ranted when a complaint is riddled with mere legal conclusions, boiler-
plate allegations, and lacks a legitimate legal basis.63 This holding
ensures that some investigation will precede the filing of a complaint.
Sometimes even modest research or even a "casual perusal" of the law
will reveal that some claims have no basis in law. 64 However, courts will
also award sanctions where the legal error is not so blatant. For exam-
ple, one court found a Rule 11 violation in an attempted joinder because
the plaintiff failed to allege anything which "even remotely" suggested
that the defendant had any contacts with the forum state.65 The defend-
ant was advised to move for sanctions because the plaintiff's unreasona-
ble pleadings imposed substantial burdens upon the defendant.66
Some attorneys believe that Rule I l's requirement of objective rea-
sonableness conflicts with their professional responsibility to pursue their
client's case zealously as required by the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.67 Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road Machinery68 held that such
an attitude is incorrect.69 The Van Berkel court stated that an attorney
has a duty to promptly dismiss a baseless suit, even over the client's ob-
jections, when the attorney learns that his client has no case.70 The court
continued that an attorney's first duty, as an officer of the court, is to
administer justice.71 Where the duties owed to a client conflict with the
duties owed to the public, the public interest must be given deference.72
Thus, the attorney's ethical obligations do not conflict with Rule 11 be-
cause both require candor with the court.
62. Id. at 399 (quoting WSB Elec. Co., v. Rank & File Comm., 103 F.R.D. 417,420 (N.D. Cal.
1984)).
63. Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 596 F. Supp. 13, 22 (N.D. Ill.) (1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d
194 (7th Cir. 1985).
64. Id. at 18.
65. Hasty v. Paccar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1577, 1580 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
66. Id. In this case, the court chose not to impose sanctions on its own motion, although it
could have done so. See Coburn Optical Indus. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656 (D.C.N.C. 1985).
Instead, the court invited the defendant to move for sanctions. Hasty, 583 F. Supp. at 1580.
67. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY Canon 7 (1980).
68. 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984).
69. Id. at 1251.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The court stated that any other idea would be counter to the judicial process.
1987]
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C. Pleadings Filed for an Improper Purpose
Attorneys must not confuse strategy with actions that have an "im-
proper purpose." The Rule itself gives examples of what may be consid-
ered an improper purpose. These examples include a pleading which is
filed to "harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation. '7 3 However, case law sheds additional light on what
may be considered an improper purpose. For example, where the plain-
tiff's attorney signed a disclaimer which would have had the effect of
destroying diversity, the court held that the disclaimer was filed for an
improper purpose.74 Claims which are considered unconscionable will
be deemed improper and will warrant sanctions." Additionally, sanc-
tions may be ordered by the court when the defendant brings counter-
claims intended to discourage the plaintiff from pursuing litigation.76
Perhaps a good test for "improper purpose" is whether the filing of
the pleading unduly diverts attention from the merits of the litigation.77
In Miller v. Affiliated Financial Corp., the court found that attention was
diverted from the merits of a case when a party was burdened with re-
sponding to a patently frivolous pleading. 78 This test would also be used
to consider whether a Rule 11 motion itself has an improper purpose, for
a claim of a Rule 11 violation is a serious one, and can itself justify Rule
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
74. Hearld v. Barnes and Spectrum Emergency Care, 107 F.R.D. 17, 19 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
75. See, eg., Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(wrongful discharge suit in which defendant employer counterclaimed for four million dollars of
punitive damages against an unemployed fifty year old woman whose husband was retired; the court
declared the claim to be unconscionable).
76. The Hudson court found no explanation for such a counterclaim "other than an overzeal-
ous attempt on the part of defendant's counsel to intimidate this and other plaintiffs from pursuing
wrongful discharge litigation." Id. at 480.
77. See Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp, 987, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
78. Id. The court continued:
What defense counsel's preciousness really did was to cause their substantive challenges...
to be advanced only in their Reply Memorandum. That placement shifted the burden of
researching and answering defendants' real arguments from Millers' counsel (where the
burden belonged) to this Court's law clerk and this Court itself (where it did not). All the
work on those issues reflected in this opinion was ours. Unfortunately Rule 1 's reference
to "an appropriate sanction" does not appear to contemplate ... a fine payable to the
District Court's fund maintained to reimburse pro bono lawyers for out-of-pocket ex-
penses, or some similar means of repaying the damage done to the justice system itself.
Some judges have sought to be creative in devising "appropriate" sanctions in the early
days of the new Rule. For example, [one court] required distribution of a copy of the
opinion finding a Rule I 1 violation to every lawyer in the offending counsel's law firm[.]
Any such emphasis on internal publicity of course ignores the possibility that the obstruc-
tionist tactics may have been known to the offending lawyer's firm generally or may even
have made the lawyer a kind of folk hero within the firm.
Id. at n.8 (citations omitted).
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11 sanctions. 9
IV. SANCTIONS
Rule 11 permits the court to impose "an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee"
for violation of the Rule.8° Must a sanction always be imposed once a
Rule 11 violation is found? The language of the statute prescribes that
the court "shall impose" sanctions upon the person. The advisory com-
mittee notes state that those words were chosen to draw the court's atten-
tion to the need for sanctions when pleadings are abused.81 However, as
if to temper the unambiguous language of Rule 11, the advisory commit-
tee notes also provide that a court preserves the essential flexibility to
appropriately handle violations of the Rule.82 Courts appear to be split
on their interpretation of this portion of the Rule. For example, some
have stated that sanctions are mandatory83 when a court finds that an
attorney has violated Rule 11.84 On the other hand, a court which will
not impose sanctions on its own motion will allow a party to move for
sanctions.85
When sanctions are imposed, they may be levied upon the attorney,
the client, or both.86  The advisory committee notes explain that "[e]ven
though it is the attorney whose signature violates the rule, it may be
appropriate under the circumstances of the case to impose a sanction on
the client."8" Where the violations in a case are legal rather than factual,
the court should impose sanctions only against the attorney. 8 On the
other hand, where the client failed to assist counsel by giving insight into
79. Harris v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 650 F. Supp. 568, 576 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (At-
torney was merely admonished for his claim).
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
82. Id.
83. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Henry (In re Curl), 803 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir.
1986).
84. Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Zaldivar v. City
of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Barton v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 55 U.S.L.W. 3822 (U.S. May 26, 1987) (No. 86-1894); accord Albright v. Upjohn
Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (6th Cir. 1986); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174-75
(D.C. Cir. 1985)).
85. Hasty v. Paccar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1577, 1580 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
88. Thompson v. Aland, 639 F. Supp. 724, 732 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
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his records, the costs may be borne equally by the client and counsel.8 9
Thus, the type of violation determines who will receive sanctions.
Attorneys are certainly interested in the types of sanctions available
under Rule 11. Expenses and attorney's fees are the obvious sanctions
under the Rule.9" However, imposing the full amount of expenses and
attorney's fees is not always necessary. 91 Because the purpose of a sanc-
tion is to deter future abuses of the legal system, rather than to reimburse
the prevailing party,92 full compensation is not always required.93
Sanctions under Rule 11 are not limited to expenses. It has been
held that sanctions may be more than just the amount of reasonable ex-
penses of the other party.94 The Rule authorizes a court "to impose...
an appropriate sanction, which may include.., the amount of the rea-
sonable expenses incurred."95 Courts therefore may examine the circum-
stances of the case to determine the amount of sanctions.
A. Factors in Amount of Sanctions
Courts will look at several factors to determine what is an appropri-
ate sanction. Although Rule 11 no longer requires subjective bad faith,
bad faith will be a factor in determining the amount of sanctions.96
Courts will also consider the "degree of frivolousness."97 Other factors
which are regarded as having great importance are "the procedural pos-
ture of the case at the time of the frivolous filing, and the extent to which
a non-monetary sanction would fulfill the spirit and tenor" of the Rule.98
89. United States v. Kirksey, 639 F. Supp. 634, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
90. Fees have been awarded for as little as fifty dollars, Heimbaugh v. City and County of San
Fransisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1984), and as much as $294,141.10, Unioil, Inc. v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Barton v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 55 U.S.L.W. 3822 (U.S. May 26, 1987) (No. 86-1894).
91. Anschutz Petroleum Mktg. Corp. v. E.W. Saybolt & Co., 112 F.R.D. 355, 357 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
92. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975) (the "Ameri-
can Rule" generally does not award fees to the prevailing party).
93. Anschutz, 112 F.R.D. at 357.
94. Moore v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 651 F. Supp. 514, 517 (E.D. Mich.
1986), appeal dismissed, 816 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1987).
95. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11) (emphasis included in original); Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., 809 F.2d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Barton v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 55 U.S.L.W. 3822 (U.S. May 26, 1987) (No. 86-1894).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes (in determining the nature and severity of
sanctions, the court should consider the "state of the attorney's or party's actual or presumed knowl-
edge"); Rice v. Heckler, 640 F. Supp. 1051, 1064-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
97. Colorado Chiropractic Council v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 650 F. Supp. 231, 243 (D. Colo.
1986).
98. Id.
[Vol. 23:149
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Another factor which is considered is the "nature of the litigation."99
The court may also consider the experience of the signing attor-
ney.t1o For example, an attorney who had only recently graduated from
law school was sanctioned only fifty dollars.1 ' On the other hand, there
may be greater expectations from a more experienced attorney. 10 2  Re-
gardless of the attorney's experience, a compressed time frame may miti-
gate sanctions.10 3
A court not only considers the nature of the law and the knowledge
of the attorneys as factors in determining the amount of sanctions, but
will also consider the circumstances of a party. For example, a court
may modify the amount sanctioned against a party, or his attorney, ac-
cording to the person's ability to pay."° A court may also consider the
sincerity of the plaintiff and an emotionally charged atmosphere as miti-
gating factors. 105 Furthermore, a court may consider the "need for com-
pensation" and the deterrent purposes of the Rule. 10 6 Finally, the type of
litigation involved may influence the size of sanctions. Some courts fear
that excessive sanctions will have a chilling effect on certain types of liti-
gation, such as civil rights actions'07 and antitrust suits. 108
B. Additional Sanctions
Rule 11 is not the only guard against abusive proceedings by attor-
neys. Under section 1927 of Title 28 a court may require one who "un-
reasonably and vexatiously" multiplies costs to pay the extra costs
resulting from that conduct.'0 9 Both section 1927 and Rule 11 comple-
99. Id.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
101. Heimbaugh v. City and County of San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
102. Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (law firm sanc-
tioned for prosecuting a counterclaim seeking more than $4,200,000 from an unemployed 50 year
old woman whose husband lived on retirement). See also Colorado Chiropractic Council v. Porter
Memorial Hosp., 650 F. Supp. 231 (D. Colo. 1986).
103. Hammonds v. Board of Election Comm'r, 112 F.R.D. 33, 35 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
104. Colorado Chiro., 650 F. Supp. at 243; Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir.)
(1986) (dicta), cert denied, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987). Heimbaugh, 591 F. Supp. at 1577.
105. Hammonds, 112 F.R.D. at 35.
106. Colorado Chiro., 650 F. Supp. at 243.
107. O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 640 F. Supp. 1451, 1471-72 (W.D. Ok. 1986) (possible award
of $59,869.02 was reduced to a payment of one-third).
108. Colorado Chiro., 650 F. Supp. at 243.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). Section 1927 states:
§ 1927. Counsel's liability for excessive costs
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably
and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, ex-
penses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
19871 FRCP 11
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ment attempts to rid the courts of abusive litigation.t"0 A court may find
that an attorney or party has violated both provisions."' A comparison
of the two provisions shows that Rule 11 is designed to sanction a know-
ingly groundless pleading, while section 1927 is designed to punish ex-
tremely vexatious behavior. For example, a section 1927 award of
attorney's fees "must be based on more egregious behavior than a sanc-
tions award under Rule 11. I A proceeding will warrant section 1927
sanctions if the lawyer acted in bad faith." 3 Even though an appeal is
found to be nonmeritorious, the court will not award attorney's fees if
there is no indication of bad faith or an attempt to delay the proceedings
for some tactical advantage.1 1 4 A further comparison of the two provi-
sions discloses that Rule 11 sanctions are generally considered
mandatory 1 5 whereas section 1927 awards are discretionary.1 6 How-
ever, the two provisions are similar with regard to investigative duties. 17
By punishing different types of conduct, Rule 11 and section 1927 pro-
tect against a wide variety of attorney abuses.
V. MECHANICS OF ENFORCEMENT
Due process requires that notice be given to the signer of a pleading
before sanctions may be imposed. 1 8 However, the judge may have suffi-
cient knowledge of the case through his participation in it, to proceed to
impose sanctions with little further inquiry." 9 The kind of notice re-
quired depends on the circumstances of the particular case. For exam-
ple, an appellant who knew generally that penalties would be imposed at
a hearing, but who did not attend the hearing, may not protest that he
did not have explicit notice that he might be sanctioned. 20
110. T. Axelberg, Sanctions Available for Attorney Misconduct: A Glimpse of 'Other' Remedies,
47 MoNT. L. REv. 87, 100 (1986).
111. O'Rourke, 640 F. Supp. at 1471.
112. Id. at 1470.
113. Id.
114. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 638 (9th Cir.
1987).
115. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). Section 1927 provides that sanctions may be imposed for unrea-
sonable or vexatious multiplication of litigation.
117. Colorado Chiropractic Council v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 650 F. Supp. 231, 239 (D. Colo.
1986). Additionally, such a duty is imposed upon attorneys by legal ethical requirements. See supra
note 67.
118. Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 88 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985); FED.
R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
120. Lepucki, 765 F.2d at 88.
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Orders denying or granting a motion for Rule 11 sanctions may gen-
erally be immediately appealed.12' Where an immediate appeal is al-
lowed, the order is considered an exception to the general rule that only
final decisions are appealable. 122 However, some Rule 11 motions which
are aimed against the party's conduct or more closely related to the mer-
its of the action may still be appealed only after final judgment. 123 Fur-
thermore, attorneys must carefully consider the appeal of a Rule 11 order
because the appeal itself may be frivolous.
124
The appellate court may invoke Rule 11 for the first time on ap-
peal. 125 One court stated that appellate courts have the power to impose
sanctions necessary to regulate the docket, and to deter frivolous plead-
ings. 126 Thus, attorneys must constantly be vigilant of Rule 11.
VI. CONCLUSION
The explosion of cases imposing sanctions since the amendment of
Rule 11 indicates that the amendment has made the Rule easier to apply.
Although the courts generally do not hesitate to impose sanctions if the
Rule has been violated, it does not appear that courts have become "trig-
ger-happy" as was feared by some attorneys. Instead, courts are adher-
ing to the spirit of the Rule as outlined in the advisory committee notes.
To temper application of the Rule, courts generally take into considera-
tion the circumstances under which the pleading, motion, or paper was
drafted and signed. Additionally, the courts have attempted to prevent a
chilling effect on litigation, especially on complex areas of law. Because
the federal Rule has been so effective, perhaps state courts should adopt
an identical rule.
121. See Frazier v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259, 262 (7th Cir. 1985); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770
F.2d 1168, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Falvey, Significant Developments in the Law: Appeal of Sanctions
Imposed Under Rule 11, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
122. See, eg., Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1172. To determine if an interlocutory order is di-
rectly reviewable, courts have applied a three part test as set out in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). To be immediately reviewable, the order "must conclusively de-
termine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
123. Falvey, supra note 121, at 2, col. 4.
124. Brown v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1986); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 (1982); FED. R. ApP. P. 38 (providing for damages and imposition of single or double costs if
an appeal is frivolous).
125. See Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1432 (10th Cir. 1986); Moulton v. Commis-
sioner, 733 F.2d 734, 735 (10th Cir.), modified, 744 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1984). See also Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766-67 (1980), superceded, 758 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1985).
126. Van Sickle, 791 F.2d at 1437.
1987]
15
Tetik: An Attorney's Primer on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987
164 TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23:149
Whether Rule 11 is effective as a deterrent on abusive attorneys re-
mains to be seen. Currently, however, the Rule remains a strong force
four years after its amendment. Even so, some legal professionals are not
aware of the stricter standards presently required of attorneys in federal
courts, and should therefore become more familiar with Rule 11.
Regina K. Tetik
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